595 lines
22 KiB
C++
595 lines
22 KiB
C++
/*
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Copyright 2015-2016 Amebis
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Copyright 2016 GÉANT
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This file is part of GÉANTLink.
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GÉANTLink is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
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under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
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(at your option) any later version.
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GÉANTLink is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
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WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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GNU General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with GÉANTLink. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#include "StdAfx.h"
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using namespace std;
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using namespace winstd;
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// eap::tls_version
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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const eap::tls_version eap::tls_version_1_0 = { 3, 1 };
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const eap::tls_version eap::tls_version_1_1 = { 3, 2 };
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const eap::tls_version eap::tls_version_1_2 = { 3, 3 };
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// eap::tls_random
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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void eap::tls_random::randomize(_In_ HCRYPTPROV cp)
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{
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_time32((__time32_t*)data);
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if (!CryptGenRandom(cp, sizeof(data) - sizeof(__time32_t), data + sizeof(__time32_t)))
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throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error creating randomness.");
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}
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// eap::tls_master_secret
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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eap::tls_master_secret::tls_master_secret()
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{
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}
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eap::tls_master_secret::tls_master_secret(_In_ HCRYPTPROV cp, _In_ tls_version ver)
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{
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data[0] = ver.major;
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data[1] = ver.minor;
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if (!CryptGenRandom(cp, sizeof(data) - 2, data + 2))
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throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error creating PMS randomness.");
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}
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eap::tls_master_secret::tls_master_secret(_In_ const sanitizing_blob_f<48> &other) :
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sanitizing_blob_xf<48>(other)
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{
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}
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#ifdef _DEBUG
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eap::tls_master_secret::tls_master_secret(_Inout_ sanitizing_blob_zf<48> &&other) :
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sanitizing_blob_xf<48>(std::move(other))
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{
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}
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#endif
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// eap::hmac_padding
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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eap::hmac_padding::hmac_padding()
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{
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}
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eap::hmac_padding::hmac_padding(
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_In_ HCRYPTPROV cp,
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_In_ ALG_ID alg,
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_In_bytecount_(size_secret ) const void *secret,
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_In_ size_t size_secret,
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_In_opt_ unsigned char pad)
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{
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if (size_secret > sizeof(hmac_padding)) {
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// If the secret is longer than padding, use secret's hash instead.
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crypt_hash hash;
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if (!hash.create(cp, alg))
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throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error creating hash.");
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if (!CryptHashData(hash, (const BYTE*)secret, (DWORD)size_secret, 0))
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throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error hashing.");
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DWORD size_hash = sizeof(hmac_padding);
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if (!CryptGetHashParam(hash, HP_HASHVAL, data, &size_hash, 0))
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throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error finishing hash.");
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size_secret = size_hash;
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} else
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memcpy(data, secret, size_secret);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < size_secret; i++)
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data[i] ^= pad;
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memset(data + size_secret, pad, sizeof(hmac_padding) - size_secret);
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}
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eap::hmac_padding::hmac_padding(_In_ const sanitizing_blob_f<64> &other) :
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sanitizing_blob_xf<64>(other)
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{
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}
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#ifdef _DEBUG
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eap::hmac_padding::hmac_padding(_Inout_ sanitizing_blob_zf<64> &&other) :
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sanitizing_blob_xf<64>(std::move(other))
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{
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}
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#endif
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// eap::hmac_hash
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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eap::hmac_hash::hmac_hash(
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_In_ HCRYPTPROV cp,
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_In_ ALG_ID alg,
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_In_bytecount_(size_secret ) const void *secret,
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_In_ size_t size_secret)
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{
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// Prepare inner padding and forward to the other constructor.
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this->hmac_hash::hmac_hash(cp, alg, hmac_padding(cp, alg, secret, size_secret));
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}
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eap::hmac_hash::hmac_hash(
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_In_ HCRYPTPROV cp,
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_In_ ALG_ID alg,
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_In_ const hmac_padding &padding)
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{
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// Create inner hash.
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if (!m_hash_inner.create(cp, alg))
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throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error creating inner hash.");
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// Initialize it with the inner padding.
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if (!CryptHashData(m_hash_inner, padding.data, sizeof(hmac_padding), 0))
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throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error hashing secret XOR inner padding.");
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// Convert inner padding to outer padding for final calculation.
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hmac_padding padding_out;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_padding); i++)
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padding_out.data[i] = padding.data[i] ^ (0x36 ^ 0x5c);
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// Create outer hash.
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if (!m_hash_outer.create(cp, alg))
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throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error creating outer hash.");
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// Initialize it with the outer padding.
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if (!CryptHashData(m_hash_outer, padding_out.data, sizeof(hmac_padding), 0))
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throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error hashing secret XOR inner padding.");
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}
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// eap::tls_conn_state
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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eap::tls_conn_state::tls_conn_state()
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#ifdef _DEBUG
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// Initialize state primitive members for diagnostic purposes.
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:
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m_prov_name (NULL),
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m_prov_type (0),
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m_alg_encrypt (0),
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m_size_enc_key (0),
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m_size_enc_iv (0),
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m_size_enc_block(0),
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m_alg_mac (0),
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m_size_mac_key (0),
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m_size_mac_hash (0)
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#endif
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{
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}
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eap::tls_conn_state::tls_conn_state(_In_ const tls_conn_state &other) :
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m_prov_name (other.m_prov_name ),
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m_prov_type (other.m_prov_type ),
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m_alg_encrypt (other.m_alg_encrypt ),
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m_size_enc_key (other.m_size_enc_key ),
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m_size_enc_iv (other.m_size_enc_iv ),
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m_size_enc_block(other.m_size_enc_block),
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m_key (other.m_key ),
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m_alg_mac (other.m_alg_mac ),
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m_size_mac_key (other.m_size_mac_key ),
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m_size_mac_hash (other.m_size_mac_hash ),
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m_padding_hmac (other.m_padding_hmac )
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{
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}
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eap::tls_conn_state::tls_conn_state(_Inout_ tls_conn_state &&other) :
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m_prov_name (std::move(other.m_prov_name )),
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m_prov_type (std::move(other.m_prov_type )),
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m_alg_encrypt (std::move(other.m_alg_encrypt )),
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m_size_enc_key (std::move(other.m_size_enc_key )),
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m_size_enc_iv (std::move(other.m_size_enc_iv )),
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m_size_enc_block(std::move(other.m_size_enc_block)),
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m_key (std::move(other.m_key )),
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m_alg_mac (std::move(other.m_alg_mac )),
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m_size_mac_key (std::move(other.m_size_mac_key )),
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m_size_mac_hash (std::move(other.m_size_mac_hash )),
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m_padding_hmac (std::move(other.m_padding_hmac ))
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{
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#ifdef _DEBUG
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// Reinitialize other state primitive members for diagnostic purposes.
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other.m_prov_name = NULL;
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other.m_prov_type = 0;
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other.m_alg_encrypt = 0;
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other.m_size_enc_key = 0;
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other.m_size_enc_iv = 0;
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other.m_size_enc_block = 0;
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other.m_alg_mac = 0;
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other.m_size_mac_key = 0;
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other.m_size_mac_hash = 0;
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#endif
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}
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eap::tls_conn_state& eap::tls_conn_state::operator=(_In_ const tls_conn_state &other)
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{
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if (this != std::addressof(other)) {
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m_prov_name = other.m_prov_name ;
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m_prov_type = other.m_prov_type ;
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m_alg_encrypt = other.m_alg_encrypt ;
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m_size_enc_key = other.m_size_enc_key ;
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m_size_enc_iv = other.m_size_enc_iv ;
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m_size_enc_block = other.m_size_enc_block;
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m_key = other.m_key ;
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m_alg_mac = other.m_alg_mac ;
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m_size_mac_key = other.m_size_mac_key ;
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m_size_mac_hash = other.m_size_mac_hash ;
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m_padding_hmac = other.m_padding_hmac ;
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}
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return *this;
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}
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eap::tls_conn_state& eap::tls_conn_state::operator=(_Inout_ tls_conn_state &&other)
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{
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if (this != std::addressof(other)) {
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m_prov_name = std::move(other.m_prov_name );
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m_prov_type = std::move(other.m_prov_type );
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m_alg_encrypt = std::move(other.m_alg_encrypt );
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m_size_enc_key = std::move(other.m_size_enc_key );
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m_size_enc_iv = std::move(other.m_size_enc_iv );
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m_size_enc_block = std::move(other.m_size_enc_block);
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m_key = std::move(other.m_key );
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m_alg_mac = std::move(other.m_alg_mac );
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m_size_mac_key = std::move(other.m_size_mac_key );
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m_size_mac_hash = std::move(other.m_size_mac_hash );
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m_padding_hmac = std::move(other.m_padding_hmac );
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#ifdef _DEBUG
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// Reinitialize other state primitive members for diagnostic purposes.
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other.m_prov_name = NULL;
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other.m_prov_type = 0;
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other.m_alg_encrypt = 0;
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other.m_size_enc_key = 0;
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other.m_size_enc_iv = 0;
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other.m_size_enc_block = 0;
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other.m_alg_mac = 0;
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other.m_size_mac_key = 0;
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other.m_size_mac_hash = 0;
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#endif
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}
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return *this;
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}
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void eap::tls_conn_state::set_cipher(_In_ const unsigned char cipher[2])
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{
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if (cipher[0] == 0x00 && cipher[1] == 0x0a) {
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// TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
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m_prov_name = NULL;
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m_prov_type = PROV_RSA_AES;
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m_alg_encrypt = CALG_3DES;
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m_size_enc_key = 192/8; // 3DES 192bits
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m_size_enc_iv = 64/8; // 3DES 64bits
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m_size_enc_block = 64/8; // 3DES 64bits
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m_alg_mac = CALG_SHA1;
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m_size_mac_key = 160/8; // SHA-1
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m_size_mac_hash = 160/8; // SHA-1
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} else if (cipher[0] == 0x00 && cipher[1] == 0x2f) {
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// TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
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m_prov_name = NULL;
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m_prov_type = PROV_RSA_AES;
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m_alg_encrypt = CALG_AES_128;
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m_size_enc_key = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_size_enc_iv = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_size_enc_block = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_alg_mac = CALG_SHA1;
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m_size_mac_key = 160/8; // SHA-1
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m_size_mac_hash = 160/8; // SHA-1
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} else if (cipher[0] == 0x00 && cipher[1] == 0x3c) {
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// AES128-SHA256
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m_prov_name = NULL;
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m_prov_type = PROV_RSA_AES;
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m_alg_encrypt = CALG_AES_128;
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m_size_enc_key = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_size_enc_iv = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_size_enc_block = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_alg_mac = CALG_SHA_256;
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m_size_mac_key = 256/8; // SHA-256
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m_size_mac_hash = 256/8; // SHA-256
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} else if (cipher[0] == 0x00 && cipher[1] == 0x3d) {
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// AES256-SHA256
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m_prov_name = MS_ENH_RSA_AES_PROV;
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m_prov_type = PROV_RSA_AES;
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m_alg_encrypt = CALG_AES_256;
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m_size_enc_key = 256/8; // AES-256
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m_size_enc_iv = 128/8; // AES-256
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m_size_enc_block = 128/8; // AES-256
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m_alg_mac = CALG_SHA_256;
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m_size_mac_key = 256/8; // SHA-256
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m_size_mac_hash = 256/8; // SHA-256
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} else if (cipher[0] == 0x00 && cipher[1] == 0x40) {
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// DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256
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m_prov_name = MS_ENH_DSS_DH_PROV;
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m_prov_type = PROV_DSS_DH;
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m_alg_encrypt = CALG_AES_128;
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m_size_enc_key = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_size_enc_iv = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_size_enc_block = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_alg_mac = CALG_SHA_256;
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m_size_mac_key = 256/8; // SHA-256
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m_size_mac_hash = 256/8; // SHA-256
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} else if (cipher[0] == 0x00 && cipher[1] == 0x67) {
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// DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
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m_prov_name = MS_DEF_DH_SCHANNEL_PROV;
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m_prov_type = PROV_DH_SCHANNEL;
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m_alg_encrypt = CALG_AES_128;
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m_size_enc_key = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_size_enc_iv = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_size_enc_block = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_alg_mac = CALG_SHA_256;
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m_size_mac_key = 256/8; // SHA-256
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m_size_mac_hash = 256/8; // SHA-256
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} else if (cipher[0] == 0x00 && cipher[1] == 0x6a) {
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// DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256
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m_prov_name = MS_ENH_DSS_DH_PROV;
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m_prov_type = PROV_DSS_DH;
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m_alg_encrypt = CALG_AES_256;
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m_size_enc_key = 256/8; // AES-256
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m_size_enc_iv = 128/8; // AES-256
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m_size_enc_block = 128/8; // AES-256
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m_alg_mac = CALG_SHA_256;
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m_size_mac_key = 256/8; // SHA-256
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m_size_mac_hash = 256/8; // SHA-256
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} else if (cipher[0] == 0x00 && cipher[1] == 0x6b) {
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// DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256
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m_prov_name = MS_DEF_DH_SCHANNEL_PROV;
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m_prov_type = PROV_DH_SCHANNEL;
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m_alg_encrypt = CALG_AES_256;
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m_size_enc_key = 256/8; // AES-256
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m_size_enc_iv = 128/8; // AES-256
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m_size_enc_block = 128/8; // AES-256
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m_alg_mac = CALG_SHA_256;
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m_size_mac_key = 256/8; // SHA-256
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m_size_mac_hash = 256/8; // SHA-256
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} else if (cipher[0] == 0xc0 && cipher[1] == 0x23) {
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// ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256
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m_prov_name = MS_ENH_DSS_DH_PROV;
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m_prov_type = PROV_DSS_DH;
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m_alg_encrypt = CALG_AES_128;
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m_size_enc_key = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_size_enc_iv = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_size_enc_block = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_alg_mac = CALG_SHA_256;
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m_size_mac_key = 256/8; // SHA-256
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m_size_mac_hash = 256/8; // SHA-256
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} else if (cipher[0] == 0xc0 && cipher[1] == 0x24) {
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// ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384
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m_prov_name = MS_ENH_DSS_DH_PROV;
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m_prov_type = PROV_DSS_DH;
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m_alg_encrypt = CALG_AES_256;
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m_size_enc_key = 256/8; // AES-256
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m_size_enc_iv = 128/8; // AES-256
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m_size_enc_block = 128/8; // AES-256
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m_alg_mac = CALG_SHA_384;
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m_size_mac_key = 384/8; // SHA-384
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m_size_mac_hash = 384/8; // SHA-384
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} else if (cipher[0] == 0xc0 && cipher[1] == 0x27) {
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// ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
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m_prov_name = MS_ENH_DSS_DH_PROV;
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m_prov_type = PROV_DSS_DH;
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m_alg_encrypt = CALG_AES_128;
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m_size_enc_key = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_size_enc_iv = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_size_enc_block = 128/8; // AES-128
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m_alg_mac = CALG_SHA_256;
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m_size_mac_key = 256/8; // SHA-256
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m_size_mac_hash = 256/8; // SHA-256
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} else if (cipher[0] == 0xc0 && cipher[1] == 0x28) {
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// ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384
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m_prov_name = MS_ENH_DSS_DH_PROV;
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m_prov_type = PROV_DSS_DH;
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m_alg_encrypt = CALG_AES_256;
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m_size_enc_key = 256/8; // AES-256
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m_size_enc_iv = 128/8; // AES-256
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m_size_enc_block = 128/8; // AES-256
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m_alg_mac = CALG_SHA_384;
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m_size_mac_key = 384/8; // SHA-384
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m_size_mac_hash = 384/8; // SHA-384
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} else
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throw win_runtime_error(ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, string_printf(__FUNCTION__ " Unknown cipher (received 0x%02x%02x).", cipher[0], cipher[1]));
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}
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// eap::packet_tls
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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eap::packet_tls::packet_tls() :
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m_flags(0),
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packet()
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{
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}
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eap::packet_tls::packet_tls(_In_ const packet_tls &other) :
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m_flags(other.m_flags),
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packet (other )
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{
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}
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eap::packet_tls::packet_tls(_Inout_ packet_tls &&other) :
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m_flags(std::move(other.m_flags)),
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packet (std::move(other ))
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{
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}
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eap::packet_tls& eap::packet_tls::operator=(_In_ const packet_tls &other)
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{
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if (this != std::addressof(other)) {
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(packet&)*this = other;
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m_flags = other.m_flags;
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}
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return *this;
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}
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eap::packet_tls& eap::packet_tls::operator=(_Inout_ packet_tls &&other)
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{
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if (this != std::addressof(other)) {
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(packet&)*this = std::move(other);
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m_flags = std::move(other.m_flags);
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}
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return *this;
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}
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void eap::packet_tls::clear()
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{
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packet::clear();
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m_flags = 0;
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}
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bool eap::packet_tls::append_frag(_In_ const EapPacket *pck)
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{
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assert(pck);
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// Get packet data pointer and size for more readable code later on.
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const unsigned char *packet_data_ptr;
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size_t size_packet_data;
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if (pck->Data[1] & flags_req_length_incl) {
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// Length field is included.
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packet_data_ptr = pck->Data + 6;
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size_packet_data = ntohs(*reinterpret_cast<const unsigned short*>(pck->Length)) - 10;
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} else {
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// Length field not included.
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packet_data_ptr = pck->Data + 2;
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size_packet_data = ntohs(*reinterpret_cast<const unsigned short*>(pck->Length)) - 6;
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}
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// Do the EAP-TLS defragmentation.
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if (pck->Data[1] & flags_req_more_frag) {
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if (m_data.empty()) {
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// Start a new packet.
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if (pck->Data[1] & flags_req_length_incl) {
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// Preallocate data according to the Length field.
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size_t size_tot = ntohl(*reinterpret_cast<const unsigned int*>(pck->Data + 2));
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m_data.reserve(size_tot);
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//m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_PACKET_RECV_FRAG_FIRST, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data((unsigned int)size_packet_data), event_data((unsigned int)size_tot), event_data::blank);
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} else {
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// The Length field was not included. Odd. Nevermind, no pre-allocation then.
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//m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_PACKET_RECV_FRAG_FIRST1, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data((unsigned int)size_packet_data), event_data::blank);
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}
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} else {
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// Mid fragment received.
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//m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_PACKET_RECV_FRAG_MID, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data((unsigned int)size_packet_data), event_data((unsigned int)m_data.size()), event_data::blank);
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}
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m_data.insert(m_data.end(), packet_data_ptr, packet_data_ptr + size_packet_data);
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return false;
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} else if (!m_data.empty()) {
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// Last fragment received. Append data.
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m_data.insert(m_data.end(), packet_data_ptr, packet_data_ptr + size_packet_data);
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//m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_PACKET_RECV_FRAG_LAST, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data((unsigned int)size_packet_data), event_data((unsigned int)m_data.size()), event_data::blank);
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} else {
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// This is a complete non-fragmented packet.
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m_data.assign(packet_data_ptr, packet_data_ptr + size_packet_data);
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//m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_PACKET_RECV, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data((unsigned int)size_packet_data), event_data::blank);
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}
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m_code = (EapCode)pck->Code;
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m_id = pck->Id;
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m_flags = pck->Data[1];
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return true;
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}
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unsigned short eap::packet_tls::get_frag(_Out_bytecap_(size_pck) EapPacket *pck, _In_ size_t size_max)
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{
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assert(pck);
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size_t size_data = m_data.size();
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assert(size_data <= UINT_MAX - 6); // Packets spanning over 4GB are not supported by EAP.
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unsigned int size_packet = (unsigned int)size_data + 6;
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unsigned short size_packet_limit = (unsigned short)std::min<size_t>(size_max, USHRT_MAX);
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unsigned char *data_dst;
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if (!(m_flags & flags_res_more_frag)) {
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// Not fragmented.
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if (size_packet <= size_packet_limit) {
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// No need to fragment the packet.
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m_flags &= ~flags_res_length_incl; // No need to explicitly include the Length field either.
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data_dst = pck->Data + 2;
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//m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_PACKET_SEND, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data((unsigned int)size_data), event_data::blank);
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} else {
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// But it should be fragmented.
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m_flags |= flags_res_length_incl | flags_res_more_frag;
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*reinterpret_cast<unsigned int*>(pck->Data + 2) = htonl(size_packet);
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data_dst = pck->Data + 6;
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size_data = size_packet_limit - 10;
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size_packet = size_packet_limit;
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//m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_PACKET_SEND_FRAG_FIRST, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data((unsigned int)size_data), event_data((unsigned int)(m_data.size() - size_data)), event_data::blank);
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}
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} else {
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// Continuing the fragmented packet...
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if (size_packet > size_packet_limit) {
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// This is a mid fragment.
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m_flags &= ~flags_res_length_incl;
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size_data = size_packet_limit - 6;
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size_packet = size_packet_limit;
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//m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_PACKET_SEND_FRAG_MID, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data((unsigned int)size_data), event_data((unsigned int)(m_data.size() - size_data)), event_data::blank);
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} else {
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// This is the last fragment.
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m_flags &= ~(flags_res_length_incl | flags_res_more_frag);
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//m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_PACKET_SEND_FRAG_LAST, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data((unsigned int)size_data), event_data((unsigned int)(m_data.size() - size_data)), event_data::blank);
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}
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data_dst = pck->Data + 2;
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}
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pck->Code = (BYTE)m_code;
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pck->Id = m_id;
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*reinterpret_cast<unsigned short*>(pck->Length) = htons((unsigned short)size_packet);
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pck->Data[0] = (BYTE)eap_type_tls;
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pck->Data[1] = m_flags;
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memcpy(data_dst, m_data.data(), size_data);
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m_data.erase(m_data.begin(), m_data.begin() + size_data);
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return (unsigned short)size_packet;
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}
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