/*
Copyright 2015-2016 Amebis
Copyright 2016 GÉANT
This file is part of GÉANTLink.
GÉANTLink is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
GÉANTLink is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with GÉANTLink. If not, see .
*/
#include "StdAfx.h"
using namespace std;
using namespace winstd;
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// eap::method_ttls
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
eap::method_ttls::method_ttls(_In_ module &module, _In_ config_provider_list &cfg, _In_ credentials_ttls &cred) :
m_cred(cred),
m_version(version_0),
method_tls(module, cfg, cred)
{
}
eap::method_ttls::method_ttls(_Inout_ method_ttls &&other) :
m_cred(other.m_cred),
m_version(std::move(other.m_version)),
method_tls(std::move(other))
{
}
eap::method_ttls& eap::method_ttls::operator=(_Inout_ method_ttls &&other)
{
if (this != std::addressof(other)) {
(method_tls&)*this = std::move(other);
m_version = std::move(other.m_version);
}
return *this;
}
void eap::method_ttls::process_request_packet(
_In_bytecount_(dwReceivedPacketSize) const EapPacket *pReceivedPacket,
_In_ DWORD dwReceivedPacketSize,
_Inout_ EapPeerMethodOutput *pEapOutput)
{
if (pReceivedPacket->Code == EapCodeRequest && (pReceivedPacket->Data[1] & flags_start)) {
// This is a start EAP-TTLS packet.
// Determine minimum EAP-TTLS version supported by server and us.
version_t ver_remote = (version_t)(pReceivedPacket->Data[1] & flags_ver_mask);
m_version = std::min(ver_remote, version_0);
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TTLS_HANDSHAKE_START, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_ttls), event_data((unsigned char)m_version), event_data((unsigned char)ver_remote), event_data::blank);
}
// Do the TLS.
method_tls::process_request_packet(pReceivedPacket, dwReceivedPacketSize, pEapOutput);
#if EAP_TLS < EAP_TLS_SCHANNEL
if (m_phase == phase_application_data) {
// Send inner authentication.
if (!m_state_client.m_alg_encrypt)
throw runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Refusing to send credentials unencrypted.");
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TTLS_INNER_CRED, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_ttls), event_data(m_cred.m_inner->get_name()), event_data::blank);
m_packet_res.m_code = EapCodeResponse;
m_packet_res.m_id = m_packet_req.m_id;
m_packet_res.m_flags = 0;
sanitizing_blob msg_application(make_message(tls_message_type_application_data, make_pap_client()));
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), msg_application.begin(), msg_application.end());
}
#endif
}
void eap::method_ttls::get_response_packet(
_Inout_bytecap_(*dwSendPacketSize) EapPacket *pSendPacket,
_Inout_ DWORD *pdwSendPacketSize)
{
method_tls::get_response_packet(pSendPacket, pdwSendPacketSize);
// Change packet type to EAP-TTLS, and add EAP-TTLS version.
pSendPacket->Data[0] = (BYTE)eap_type_ttls;
pSendPacket->Data[1] &= ~flags_ver_mask;
pSendPacket->Data[1] |= m_version;
}
void eap::method_ttls::get_result(
_In_ EapPeerMethodResultReason reason,
_Inout_ EapPeerMethodResult *ppResult)
{
if (m_phase != phase_application_data) {
// Do the TLS.
method_tls::get_result(reason, ppResult);
} else {
// The TLS finished, this is inner authentication's bussines.
config_provider &cfg_prov(m_cfg.m_providers.front());
config_method_ttls *cfg_method = dynamic_cast(cfg_prov.m_methods.front().get());
assert(cfg_method);
switch (reason) {
case EapPeerMethodResultSuccess: {
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TTLS_INNER_SUCCESS, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_ttls), event_data::blank);
cfg_method->m_inner->m_auth_failed = false;
break;
}
case EapPeerMethodResultFailure:
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TTLS_INNER_FAILURE, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_ttls), event_data::blank);
cfg_method->m_inner->m_auth_failed = true;
break;
default:
throw win_runtime_error(ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, __FUNCTION__ " Not supported.");
}
#if EAP_TLS >= EAP_TLS_SCHANNEL
// EAP-TTLS uses different label in PRF for MSK derivation than EAP-TLS.
static const DWORD s_key_id = 0x01; // EAP-TTLSv0 Keying Material
static const SecPkgContext_EapPrfInfo s_prf_info = { 0, sizeof(s_key_id), (PBYTE)&s_key_id };
SECURITY_STATUS status = SetContextAttributes(m_sc_ctx, SECPKG_ATTR_EAP_PRF_INFO, (void*)&s_prf_info, sizeof(s_prf_info));
if (FAILED(status))
throw sec_runtime_error(status, __FUNCTION__ "Error setting EAP-TTLS PRF in Schannel.");
#endif
// The TLS was OK.
method_tls::get_result(EapPeerMethodResultSuccess, ppResult);
// Do not report failure to EAPHost, as it will not save updated configuration then. But we need it to save it, to alert user on next connection attempt.
// EAPHost is well aware of the failed condition.
//if (reason == EapPeerMethodResultFailure) {
// ppResult->fIsSuccess = FALSE;
// ppResult->dwFailureReasonCode = EAP_E_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
//}
}
}
#if EAP_TLS < EAP_TLS_SCHANNEL
void eap::method_ttls::derive_msk()
{
//
// TLS versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] define the same PRF
// function, and any EAP-TTLSv0 implementation based on these versions
// of TLS must use the PRF defined therein. It is expected that future
// versions of or extensions to the TLS protocol will permit alternative
// PRF functions to be negotiated. If an alternative PRF function is
// specified for the underlying TLS version or has been negotiated
// during the TLS handshake negotiation, then that alternative PRF
// function must be used in EAP-TTLSv0 computations instead of the TLS
// 1.0/1.1 PRF.
//
// [Extensible Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0) (Chapter 7.8. Use of TLS PRF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5281#section-7.8)
//
// If we use PRF_SHA256() the key exchange fails. Therefore we use PRF of TLS 1.0/1.1.
//
static const unsigned char s_label[] = "ttls keying material";
sanitizing_blob seed(s_label, s_label + _countof(s_label) - 1);
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_client, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_client + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_server, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_server + 1));
sanitizing_blob key_block(prf(m_cp, CALG_TLS1PRF, m_master_secret, seed, 2*sizeof(tls_random)));
const unsigned char *_key_block = key_block.data();
// MSK: MPPE-Recv-Key
memcpy(&m_key_mppe_client, _key_block, sizeof(tls_random));
_key_block += sizeof(tls_random);
// MSK: MPPE-Send-Key
memcpy(&m_key_mppe_server, _key_block, sizeof(tls_random));
_key_block += sizeof(tls_random);
}
#else
void eap::method_ttls::process_application_data(_In_bytecount_(size_msg) const void *msg, _In_ size_t size_msg)
{
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(msg);
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(size_msg);
// Prepare inner authentication.
if (!(m_sc_ctx.m_attrib & ISC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY))
throw runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Refusing to send credentials unencrypted.");
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TTLS_INNER_CRED, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_ttls), event_data(m_cred.m_inner->get_name()), event_data::blank);
SECURITY_STATUS status;
// Get maximum message sizes.
SecPkgContext_StreamSizes sizes;
status = QueryContextAttributes(m_sc_ctx, SECPKG_ATTR_STREAM_SIZES, &sizes);
if (FAILED(status))
throw sec_runtime_error(status, __FUNCTION__ " Error getting Schannel required encryption sizes.");
// Make PAP message.
sanitizing_blob msg_pap(make_pap_client());
assert(msg_pap.size() < sizes.cbMaximumMessage);
unsigned long size_data = std::min(sizes.cbMaximumMessage, (unsigned long)msg_pap.size()); // Truncate
sanitizing_blob data(sizes.cbHeader + size_data + sizes.cbTrailer, 0);
memcpy(data.data() + sizes.cbHeader, msg_pap.data(), size_data);
// Prepare input/output buffer(s).
SecBuffer buf[] = {
{ sizes.cbHeader, SECBUFFER_STREAM_HEADER , data.data() },
{ size_data, SECBUFFER_DATA , data.data() + sizes.cbHeader },
{ sizes.cbTrailer, SECBUFFER_STREAM_TRAILER, data.data() + sizes.cbHeader + size_data },
{ 0, SECBUFFER_EMPTY , NULL },
};
SecBufferDesc buf_desc = {
SECBUFFER_VERSION,
_countof(buf),
buf
};
// Encrypt the message.
status = EncryptMessage(m_sc_ctx, 0, &buf_desc, 0);
if (FAILED(status))
throw sec_runtime_error(status, __FUNCTION__ " Error encrypting message.");
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), (const unsigned char*)buf[0].pvBuffer, (const unsigned char*)buf[0].pvBuffer + buf[0].cbBuffer + buf[1].cbBuffer + buf[2].cbBuffer);
}
#endif
eap::sanitizing_blob eap::method_ttls::make_pap_client() const
{
const credentials_pap *cred = dynamic_cast(m_cred.m_inner.get());
if (!cred)
throw invalid_argument(__FUNCTION__ " Inner credentials missing or not PAP.");
// Convert username and password to UTF-8.
sanitizing_string identity_utf8, password_utf8;
WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, cred->m_identity.c_str(), (int)cred->m_identity.length(), identity_utf8, NULL, NULL);
WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, cred->m_password.c_str(), (int)cred->m_password.length(), password_utf8, NULL, NULL);
// PAP passwords must be padded to 16B boundary according to RFC 5281. Will not add random extra padding here, as length obfuscation should be done by TLS encryption layer.
size_t padding_password_ex = (16 - password_utf8.length()) % 16;
password_utf8.append(padding_password_ex, 0);
size_t
size_identity = identity_utf8.length(),
size_password = password_utf8.length(),
padding_identity = (4 - size_identity ) % 4,
padding_password = (4 - password_utf8.length()) % 4,
size_identity_outer,
size_password_outer;
sanitizing_blob msg;
msg.reserve(
(size_identity_outer =
4 + // Diameter AVP Code
4 + // Diameter AVP Flags & Length
size_identity) + // Identity
padding_identity + // Identity padding
(size_password_outer =
4 + // Diameter AVP Code
4 + // Diameter AVP Flags & Length
size_password) + // Password
padding_password); // Password padding
// Diameter AVP Code User-Name (0x00000001)
msg.push_back(0x00);
msg.push_back(0x00);
msg.push_back(0x00);
msg.push_back(0x01);
// Diameter AVP Flags & Length
unsigned int identity_hdr = htonl((diameter_avp_flag_mandatory << 24) | (unsigned int)size_identity_outer);
msg.insert(msg.end(), (unsigned char*)&identity_hdr, (unsigned char*)(&identity_hdr + 1));
// Identity
msg.insert(msg.end(), identity_utf8.begin(), identity_utf8.end());
msg.insert(msg.end(), padding_identity, 0);
// Diameter AVP Code User-Password (0x00000002)
msg.push_back(0x00);
msg.push_back(0x00);
msg.push_back(0x00);
msg.push_back(0x02);
// Diameter AVP Flags & Length
unsigned int password_hdr = htonl((diameter_avp_flag_mandatory << 24) | (unsigned int)size_password_outer);
msg.insert(msg.end(), (unsigned char*)&password_hdr, (unsigned char*)(&password_hdr + 1));
// Password
msg.insert(msg.end(), password_utf8.begin(), password_utf8.end());
msg.insert(msg.end(), padding_password, 0);
return msg;
}