/* Copyright 2015-2016 Amebis Copyright 2016 GÉANT This file is part of GÉANTLink. GÉANTLink is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. GÉANTLink is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with GÉANTLink. If not, see . */ #include "StdAfx.h" using namespace std; using namespace winstd; ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // eap::method_ttls ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// eap::method_ttls::method_ttls(_In_ module &module, _In_ config_provider_list &cfg, _In_ credentials_ttls &cred) : m_cred(cred), m_version(version_0), method_tls(module, cfg, cred) { } eap::method_ttls::method_ttls(_Inout_ method_ttls &&other) : m_cred(other.m_cred), m_version(std::move(other.m_version)), method_tls(std::move(other)) { } eap::method_ttls& eap::method_ttls::operator=(_Inout_ method_ttls &&other) { if (this != std::addressof(other)) { (method_tls&)*this = std::move(other); m_version = std::move(other.m_version); } return *this; } void eap::method_ttls::process_request_packet( _In_bytecount_(dwReceivedPacketSize) const EapPacket *pReceivedPacket, _In_ DWORD dwReceivedPacketSize, _Inout_ EapPeerMethodOutput *pEapOutput) { if (pReceivedPacket->Code == EapCodeRequest && (pReceivedPacket->Data[1] & flags_start)) { // This is a start EAP-TTLS packet. // Determine minimum EAP-TTLS version supported by server and us. version_t ver_remote = (version_t)(pReceivedPacket->Data[1] & flags_ver_mask); m_version = std::min(ver_remote, version_0); m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TTLS_HANDSHAKE_START, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_ttls), event_data((unsigned char)m_version), event_data((unsigned char)ver_remote), event_data::blank); } // Do the TLS. method_tls::process_request_packet(pReceivedPacket, dwReceivedPacketSize, pEapOutput); #if EAP_TLS < EAP_TLS_SCHANNEL if (m_phase == phase_application_data) { // Send inner authentication. if (!m_state_client.m_alg_encrypt) throw runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Refusing to send credentials unencrypted."); m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TTLS_INNER_CRED, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_ttls), event_data(m_cred.m_inner->get_name()), event_data::blank); m_packet_res.m_code = EapCodeResponse; m_packet_res.m_id = m_packet_req.m_id; m_packet_res.m_flags = 0; sanitizing_blob msg_application(make_message(tls_message_type_application_data, make_pap_client())); m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), msg_application.begin(), msg_application.end()); } #endif } void eap::method_ttls::get_response_packet( _Inout_bytecap_(*dwSendPacketSize) EapPacket *pSendPacket, _Inout_ DWORD *pdwSendPacketSize) { method_tls::get_response_packet(pSendPacket, pdwSendPacketSize); // Change packet type to EAP-TTLS, and add EAP-TTLS version. pSendPacket->Data[0] = (BYTE)eap_type_ttls; pSendPacket->Data[1] &= ~flags_ver_mask; pSendPacket->Data[1] |= m_version; } void eap::method_ttls::get_result( _In_ EapPeerMethodResultReason reason, _Inout_ EapPeerMethodResult *ppResult) { if (m_phase != phase_application_data) { // Do the TLS. method_tls::get_result(reason, ppResult); } else { // The TLS finished, this is inner authentication's bussines. config_provider &cfg_prov(m_cfg.m_providers.front()); config_method_ttls *cfg_method = dynamic_cast(cfg_prov.m_methods.front().get()); assert(cfg_method); switch (reason) { case EapPeerMethodResultSuccess: { m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TTLS_INNER_SUCCESS, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_ttls), event_data::blank); cfg_method->m_inner->m_auth_failed = false; break; } case EapPeerMethodResultFailure: m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TTLS_INNER_FAILURE, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_ttls), event_data::blank); cfg_method->m_inner->m_auth_failed = true; break; default: throw win_runtime_error(ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, __FUNCTION__ " Not supported."); } #if EAP_TLS >= EAP_TLS_SCHANNEL // EAP-TTLS uses different label in PRF for MSK derivation than EAP-TLS. static const DWORD s_key_id = 0x01; // EAP-TTLSv0 Keying Material static const SecPkgContext_EapPrfInfo s_prf_info = { 0, sizeof(s_key_id), (PBYTE)&s_key_id }; SECURITY_STATUS status = SetContextAttributes(m_sc_ctx, SECPKG_ATTR_EAP_PRF_INFO, (void*)&s_prf_info, sizeof(s_prf_info)); if (FAILED(status)) throw sec_runtime_error(status, __FUNCTION__ "Error setting EAP-TTLS PRF in Schannel."); #endif // The TLS was OK. method_tls::get_result(EapPeerMethodResultSuccess, ppResult); // Do not report failure to EAPHost, as it will not save updated configuration then. But we need it to save it, to alert user on next connection attempt. // EAPHost is well aware of the failed condition. //if (reason == EapPeerMethodResultFailure) { // ppResult->fIsSuccess = FALSE; // ppResult->dwFailureReasonCode = EAP_E_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; //} } } #if EAP_TLS < EAP_TLS_SCHANNEL void eap::method_ttls::derive_msk() { // // TLS versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] define the same PRF // function, and any EAP-TTLSv0 implementation based on these versions // of TLS must use the PRF defined therein. It is expected that future // versions of or extensions to the TLS protocol will permit alternative // PRF functions to be negotiated. If an alternative PRF function is // specified for the underlying TLS version or has been negotiated // during the TLS handshake negotiation, then that alternative PRF // function must be used in EAP-TTLSv0 computations instead of the TLS // 1.0/1.1 PRF. // // [Extensible Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0) (Chapter 7.8. Use of TLS PRF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5281#section-7.8) // // If we use PRF_SHA256() the key exchange fails. Therefore we use PRF of TLS 1.0/1.1. // static const unsigned char s_label[] = "ttls keying material"; sanitizing_blob seed(s_label, s_label + _countof(s_label) - 1); seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_client, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_client + 1)); seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_server, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_server + 1)); sanitizing_blob key_block(prf(m_cp, CALG_TLS1PRF, m_master_secret, seed, 2*sizeof(tls_random))); const unsigned char *_key_block = key_block.data(); // MSK: MPPE-Recv-Key memcpy(&m_key_mppe_client, _key_block, sizeof(tls_random)); _key_block += sizeof(tls_random); // MSK: MPPE-Send-Key memcpy(&m_key_mppe_server, _key_block, sizeof(tls_random)); _key_block += sizeof(tls_random); } #else void eap::method_ttls::process_application_data(_In_bytecount_(size_msg) const void *msg, _In_ size_t size_msg) { UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(msg); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(size_msg); // Prepare inner authentication. if (!(m_sc_ctx.m_attrib & ISC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY)) throw runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Refusing to send credentials unencrypted."); m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TTLS_INNER_CRED, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_ttls), event_data(m_cred.m_inner->get_name()), event_data::blank); SECURITY_STATUS status; // Get maximum message sizes. SecPkgContext_StreamSizes sizes; status = QueryContextAttributes(m_sc_ctx, SECPKG_ATTR_STREAM_SIZES, &sizes); if (FAILED(status)) throw sec_runtime_error(status, __FUNCTION__ " Error getting Schannel required encryption sizes."); // Make PAP message. sanitizing_blob msg_pap(make_pap_client()); assert(msg_pap.size() < sizes.cbMaximumMessage); unsigned long size_data = std::min(sizes.cbMaximumMessage, (unsigned long)msg_pap.size()); // Truncate sanitizing_blob data(sizes.cbHeader + size_data + sizes.cbTrailer, 0); memcpy(data.data() + sizes.cbHeader, msg_pap.data(), size_data); // Prepare input/output buffer(s). SecBuffer buf[] = { { sizes.cbHeader, SECBUFFER_STREAM_HEADER , data.data() }, { size_data, SECBUFFER_DATA , data.data() + sizes.cbHeader }, { sizes.cbTrailer, SECBUFFER_STREAM_TRAILER, data.data() + sizes.cbHeader + size_data }, { 0, SECBUFFER_EMPTY , NULL }, }; SecBufferDesc buf_desc = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, _countof(buf), buf }; // Encrypt the message. status = EncryptMessage(m_sc_ctx, 0, &buf_desc, 0); if (FAILED(status)) throw sec_runtime_error(status, __FUNCTION__ " Error encrypting message."); m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), (const unsigned char*)buf[0].pvBuffer, (const unsigned char*)buf[0].pvBuffer + buf[0].cbBuffer + buf[1].cbBuffer + buf[2].cbBuffer); } #endif eap::sanitizing_blob eap::method_ttls::make_pap_client() const { const credentials_pap *cred = dynamic_cast(m_cred.m_inner.get()); if (!cred) throw invalid_argument(__FUNCTION__ " Inner credentials missing or not PAP."); // Convert username and password to UTF-8. sanitizing_string identity_utf8, password_utf8; WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, cred->m_identity.c_str(), (int)cred->m_identity.length(), identity_utf8, NULL, NULL); WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, cred->m_password.c_str(), (int)cred->m_password.length(), password_utf8, NULL, NULL); // PAP passwords must be padded to 16B boundary according to RFC 5281. Will not add random extra padding here, as length obfuscation should be done by TLS encryption layer. size_t padding_password_ex = (16 - password_utf8.length()) % 16; password_utf8.append(padding_password_ex, 0); size_t size_identity = identity_utf8.length(), size_password = password_utf8.length(), padding_identity = (4 - size_identity ) % 4, padding_password = (4 - password_utf8.length()) % 4, size_identity_outer, size_password_outer; sanitizing_blob msg; msg.reserve( (size_identity_outer = 4 + // Diameter AVP Code 4 + // Diameter AVP Flags & Length size_identity) + // Identity padding_identity + // Identity padding (size_password_outer = 4 + // Diameter AVP Code 4 + // Diameter AVP Flags & Length size_password) + // Password padding_password); // Password padding // Diameter AVP Code User-Name (0x00000001) msg.push_back(0x00); msg.push_back(0x00); msg.push_back(0x00); msg.push_back(0x01); // Diameter AVP Flags & Length unsigned int identity_hdr = htonl((diameter_avp_flag_mandatory << 24) | (unsigned int)size_identity_outer); msg.insert(msg.end(), (unsigned char*)&identity_hdr, (unsigned char*)(&identity_hdr + 1)); // Identity msg.insert(msg.end(), identity_utf8.begin(), identity_utf8.end()); msg.insert(msg.end(), padding_identity, 0); // Diameter AVP Code User-Password (0x00000002) msg.push_back(0x00); msg.push_back(0x00); msg.push_back(0x00); msg.push_back(0x02); // Diameter AVP Flags & Length unsigned int password_hdr = htonl((diameter_avp_flag_mandatory << 24) | (unsigned int)size_password_outer); msg.insert(msg.end(), (unsigned char*)&password_hdr, (unsigned char*)(&password_hdr + 1)); // Password msg.insert(msg.end(), password_utf8.begin(), password_utf8.end()); msg.insert(msg.end(), padding_password, 0); return msg; }