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- TLS revised (again)

Browse Source 
- TLS Session resumption issues resolved
- Credential prompt has "Remember" checkbox initially selected when credentials originate from Windows Credential Manager
- Last authentication attempt failure notice is more general and no longer insinuate user credentials are the likely cause of the failure
- Additional log messages added
This commit is contained in:
Simon Rozman
2016-08-17 11:50:34 +02:00
parent 16527c8124
commit df1d431bd0
19 changed files with 277 additions and 218 deletions
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2
lib/TLS/include/Credentials.h
View File

@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ namespace eap
/// - \c true if credentials were set;
/// - \c false otherwise
///
bool combine(
source_t combine(
_In_ const credentials_tls *cred_cached,
_In_ const config_method_tls &cfg,
_In_opt_z_ LPCTSTR pszTargetName);

21
lib/TLS/include/Method.h
View File

@@ -467,6 +467,7 @@ namespace eap
///
/// \sa [How to export and import plain text session keys by using CryptoAPI](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/228786)
///
/// \param[in] cp Handle of the cryptographics provider
/// \param[in] alg Key algorithm
/// \param[in] key Key that decrypts \p secret
/// \param[in] secret Key data
@@ -475,10 +476,11 @@ namespace eap
/// \returns Key
///
HCRYPTKEY create_key(
_In_ ALG_ID alg,
_In_ HCRYPTKEY key,
_In_bytecount_(size_secret) const void *secret,
_In_ size_t size_secret);
_In_ HCRYPTPROV cp,
_In_ ALG_ID alg,
_In_ HCRYPTKEY key,
_In_bytecount_(size_secret) const void *secret,
_In_ size_t size_secret);
protected:
credentials_tls &m_cred; ///< EAP-TLS user credentials
@@ -487,7 +489,8 @@ namespace eap
packet m_packet_res; ///< Response packet
winstd::crypt_prov m_cp; ///< Cryptography provider for general services
winstd::crypt_prov m_cp_enc; ///< Cryptography provider for encryption
winstd::crypt_prov m_cp_enc_client; ///< Cryptography provider for encryption
winstd::crypt_prov m_cp_enc_server; ///< Cryptography provider for encryption
winstd::crypt_key m_key_exp1; ///< Key for importing derived keys
tls_version m_tls_version; ///< TLS version in use
@@ -515,6 +518,14 @@ namespace eap
bool m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_max]; ///< Handshake flags (map od handshake messages received)
enum {
phase_unknown = -1, ///< Unknown phase
phase_client_hello = 0, ///< Send client hello
phase_server_hello, ///< Wait for server hello
phase_change_cipher_spec, ///< Wait for change cipher spec
phase_application_data ///< Exchange application data
} m_phase; ///< What phase is our communication at?
unsigned __int64 m_seq_num_client; ///< Sequence number for encrypting
unsigned __int64 m_seq_num_server; ///< Sequence number for decrypting

10
lib/TLS/src/Credentials.cpp
View File

@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ tstring eap::credentials_tls::get_name() const
}
bool eap::credentials_tls::combine(
eap::credentials::source_t eap::credentials_tls::combine(
_In_ const credentials_tls *cred_cached,
_In_ const config_method_tls &cfg,
_In_opt_z_ LPCTSTR pszTargetName)
@@ -263,14 +263,14 @@ bool eap::credentials_tls::combine(
// Using EAP service cached credentials.
*this = *cred_cached;
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TRACE_EVT_CRED_CACHED1, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data(credentials_tls::get_name()), event_data::blank);
return true;
return source_cache;
}
if (cfg.m_use_preshared) {
// Using preshared credentials.
*this = *(credentials_tls*)cfg.m_preshared.get();
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TRACE_EVT_CRED_PRESHARED1, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data(credentials_tls::get_name()), event_data::blank);
return true;
return source_preshared;
}
if (pszTargetName) {
@@ -281,13 +281,13 @@ bool eap::credentials_tls::combine(
// Using stored credentials.
*this = std::move(cred_loaded);
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TRACE_EVT_CRED_STORED1, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data(credentials_tls::get_name()), event_data::blank);
return true;
return source_storage;
} catch (...) {
// Not actually an error.
}
}
return false;
return source_unknown;
}

282
lib/TLS/src/Method.cpp
View File

@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ void eap::method_tls::packet::clear()
eap::method_tls::method_tls(_In_ module &module, _In_ config_provider_list &cfg, _In_ credentials_tls &cred) :
m_cred(cred),
m_phase(phase_unknown),
m_seq_num_client(0),
m_seq_num_server(0),
m_blob_cfg(NULL),
@@ -113,7 +114,8 @@ eap::method_tls::method_tls(_Inout_ method_tls &&other) :
m_packet_req (std::move(other.m_packet_req )),
m_packet_res (std::move(other.m_packet_res )),
m_cp (std::move(other.m_cp )),
m_cp_enc (std::move(other.m_cp_enc )),
m_cp_enc_client (std::move(other.m_cp_enc_client )),
m_cp_enc_server (std::move(other.m_cp_enc_server )),
m_key_exp1 (std::move(other.m_key_exp1 )),
m_tls_version (std::move(other.m_tls_version )),
m_alg_prf (std::move(other.m_alg_prf )),
@@ -131,6 +133,7 @@ eap::method_tls::method_tls(_Inout_ method_tls &&other) :
m_hash_handshake_msgs_md5 (std::move(other.m_hash_handshake_msgs_md5 )),
m_hash_handshake_msgs_sha1 (std::move(other.m_hash_handshake_msgs_sha1 )),
m_hash_handshake_msgs_sha256(std::move(other.m_hash_handshake_msgs_sha256)),
m_phase (std::move(other.m_phase )),
m_seq_num_client (std::move(other.m_seq_num_client )),
m_seq_num_server (std::move(other.m_seq_num_server )),
method (std::move(other ))
@@ -162,7 +165,8 @@ eap::method_tls& eap::method_tls::operator=(_Inout_ method_tls &&other)
m_packet_req = std::move(other.m_packet_req );
m_packet_res = std::move(other.m_packet_res );
m_cp = std::move(other.m_cp );
m_cp_enc = std::move(other.m_cp_enc );
m_cp_enc_client = std::move(other.m_cp_enc_client );
m_cp_enc_server = std::move(other.m_cp_enc_server );
m_key_exp1 = std::move(other.m_key_exp1 );
m_tls_version = std::move(other.m_tls_version );
m_alg_prf = std::move(other.m_alg_prf );
@@ -180,6 +184,7 @@ eap::method_tls& eap::method_tls::operator=(_Inout_ method_tls &&other)
m_hash_handshake_msgs_md5 = std::move(other.m_hash_handshake_msgs_md5 );
m_hash_handshake_msgs_sha1 = std::move(other.m_hash_handshake_msgs_sha1 );
m_hash_handshake_msgs_sha256 = std::move(other.m_hash_handshake_msgs_sha256);
m_phase = std::move(other.m_phase );
m_seq_num_client = std::move(other.m_seq_num_client );
m_seq_num_server = std::move(other.m_seq_num_server );
@@ -201,7 +206,7 @@ void eap::method_tls::begin_session(
{
method::begin_session(dwFlags, pAttributeArray, hTokenImpersonateUser, dwMaxSendPacketSize);
// Create cryptographics provider.
// Create cryptographics provider for support needs (handshake hashing, client random, temporary keys...).
if (!m_cp.create(NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_AES))
throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error creating cryptographics provider.");
@@ -217,9 +222,9 @@ void eap::method_tls::begin_session(
const config_method_tls *cfg_method = dynamic_cast<const config_method_tls*>(cfg_prov.m_methods.front().get());
assert(cfg_method);
//// Restore previous session ID and master secret. We might get lucky.
//m_session_id = cfg_method->m_session_id;
//m_master_secret = cfg_method->m_master_secret;
// Restore previous session ID and master secret. We might get lucky.
m_session_id = cfg_method->m_session_id;
m_master_secret = cfg_method->m_master_secret;
}
@@ -314,6 +319,17 @@ void eap::method_tls::process_request_packet(
if (pReceivedPacket->Code == EapCodeRequest && (m_packet_req.m_flags & flags_req_start)) {
// This is the EAP-TLS start message: (re)initialize method.
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TLS_HANDSHAKE_START2, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data::blank);
m_phase = phase_client_hello;
} else {
// Process the packet.
memset(m_handshake, 0, sizeof(m_handshake));
m_packet_res.m_data.clear();
process_packet(m_packet_req.m_data.data(), m_packet_req.m_data.size());
}
switch (m_phase) {
case phase_client_hello: {
m_tls_version = tls_version_1_2;
m_key_mppe_client.clear();
m_key_mppe_server.clear();
@@ -328,109 +344,122 @@ void eap::method_tls::process_request_packet(
if (!m_hash_handshake_msgs_sha256.create(m_cp, CALG_SHA_256))
throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error creating SHA-256 hashing object.");
memset(m_handshake, 0, sizeof(m_handshake));
m_seq_num_client = 0;
m_seq_num_server = 0;
// Build client hello packet.
sanitizing_blob msg_client_hello(make_message(tls_message_type_handshake, make_client_hello()));
m_packet_res.m_data.assign(msg_client_hello.begin(), msg_client_hello.end());
} else {
// Process the packet.
m_packet_res.m_data.clear();
process_packet(m_packet_req.m_data.data(), m_packet_req.m_data.size());
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), msg_client_hello.begin(), msg_client_hello.end());
if (m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_finished]) {
// Server finished.
} else if (m_state_server.m_alg_encrypt) {
// Cipher specified (server).
} else if (m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_server_hello_done]) {
// Server hello specified.
m_phase = phase_server_hello;
break;
}
// Create cryptographics provider (based on server selected cipher?).
if (!m_cp_enc.create(NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_AES))
throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error creating cryptographics provider.");
case phase_server_hello: {
if (!m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_server_hello])
throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Server did not hello back. No server random! What cipher to use?");
// Create cryptographics provider (based on server selected cipher?).
if (!m_cp_enc_client.create(NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_AES))
throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error creating cryptographics provider.");
if (m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_certificate]) {
// Do we trust this server?
if (m_server_cert_chain.empty())
throw win_runtime_error(ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILED, __FUNCTION__ " Can not continue without server's certificate.");
throw win_runtime_error(ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILED, __FUNCTION__ " Server sent an empty certificate (chain).");
verify_server_trust();
if (m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_certificate_request]) {
// Client certificate requested.
sanitizing_blob msg_client_cert(make_message(tls_message_type_handshake, make_client_cert()));
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), msg_client_cert.begin(), msg_client_cert.end());
}
{
// Generate pre-master secret. PMS will get sanitized in its destructor when going out-of-scope.
tls_master_secret pms(m_cp_enc, m_tls_version);
// Derive master secret.
static const unsigned char s_label[] = "master secret";
sanitizing_blob seed(s_label, s_label + _countof(s_label) - 1);
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_client, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_client + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_server, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_server + 1));
memcpy(&m_master_secret, prf(m_cp_enc, m_alg_prf, pms, seed, sizeof(tls_master_secret)).data(), sizeof(tls_master_secret));
// Create client key exchange message, and append to packet.
sanitizing_blob msg_client_key_exchange(make_message(tls_message_type_handshake, make_client_key_exchange(pms)));
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), msg_client_key_exchange.begin(), msg_client_key_exchange.end());
}
if (m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_certificate_request]) {
// TODO: Create and append certificate_verify message!
}
// Append change cipher spec to packet.
sanitizing_blob ccs(make_message(tls_message_type_change_cipher_spec, sanitizing_blob(1, 1)));
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), ccs.begin(), ccs.end());
{
// Adopt server provided pending state as client pending.
m_state_client_pending = m_state_server_pending;
// Derive client side keys
static const unsigned char s_label[] = "key expansion";
sanitizing_blob seed(s_label, s_label + _countof(s_label) - 1);
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_server, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_server + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_client, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_client + 1));
sanitizing_blob key_block(prf(m_cp_enc, m_alg_prf, m_master_secret, seed,
2*m_state_client_pending.m_size_mac_key + // client_write_MAC_secret & server_write_MAC_secret (SHA1)
2*m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_key + // client_write_key & server_write_key
2*m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_iv )); // client_write_IV & server_write_IV
const unsigned char *_key_block = key_block.data();
// client_write_MAC_secret
m_state_client_pending.m_padding_hmac = hmac_padding(m_cp_enc, m_state_client_pending.m_alg_mac, _key_block, m_state_client_pending.m_size_mac_key);
_key_block += m_state_client_pending.m_size_mac_key;
// server_write_MAC_secret
_key_block += m_state_client_pending.m_size_mac_key;
// client_write_key
m_state_client_pending.m_key = create_key(m_state_client_pending.m_alg_encrypt, m_key_exp1, _key_block, m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_key);
_key_block += m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_key;
// server_write_key
_key_block += m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_key;
if (m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_iv && m_tls_version < tls_version_1_1) {
// client_write_IV
if (!CryptSetKeyParam(m_state_client_pending.m_key, KP_IV, _key_block, 0))
throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error setting client_write_IV.");
_key_block += m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_iv;
}
// Accept client pending state as current client state.
m_state_client = std::move(m_state_client_pending);
}
// Create finished message, and append to packet.
sanitizing_blob msg_finished(make_message(tls_message_type_handshake, make_finished()));
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), msg_finished.begin(), msg_finished.end());
}
if (m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_certificate_request]) {
// Client certificate requested.
sanitizing_blob msg_client_cert(make_message(tls_message_type_handshake, make_client_cert()));
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), msg_client_cert.begin(), msg_client_cert.end());
}
if (m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_server_hello_done]) {
if (m_server_cert_chain.empty())
throw win_runtime_error(ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILED, __FUNCTION__ " Can not do a client key exchange without a server public key (missing server certificate).");
// Generate pre-master secret. PMS will get sanitized in its destructor when going out-of-scope.
// Always use latest supported version by client (not negotiated one, to detect version rollback attacks).
tls_master_secret pms(m_cp_enc_client, tls_version_1_2);
// Derive master secret.
static const unsigned char s_label[] = "master secret";
sanitizing_blob seed(s_label, s_label + _countof(s_label) - 1);
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_client, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_client + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_server, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_server + 1));
memcpy(&m_master_secret, prf(m_cp_enc_client, m_alg_prf, pms, seed, sizeof(tls_master_secret)).data(), sizeof(tls_master_secret));
// Create client key exchange message, and append to packet.
sanitizing_blob msg_client_key_exchange(make_message(tls_message_type_handshake, make_client_key_exchange(pms)));
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), msg_client_key_exchange.begin(), msg_client_key_exchange.end());
}
if (m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_certificate_request]) {
// TODO: Create and append client certificate verify message!
}
// Append change cipher spec to packet.
sanitizing_blob ccs(make_message(tls_message_type_change_cipher_spec, sanitizing_blob(1, 1)));
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), ccs.begin(), ccs.end());
// Adopt server state as client pending.
// If server already send the change cipher spec, use active server state. Otherwise pending.
m_state_client_pending = m_state_server.m_alg_encrypt ? m_state_server : m_state_server_pending;
// Derive client side keys.
static const unsigned char s_label[] = "key expansion";
sanitizing_blob seed(s_label, s_label + _countof(s_label) - 1);
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_server, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_server + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_client, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_client + 1));
sanitizing_blob key_block(prf(m_cp_enc_client, m_alg_prf, m_master_secret, seed,
2*m_state_client_pending.m_size_mac_key + // client_write_MAC_secret & server_write_MAC_secret (SHA1)
2*m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_key + // client_write_key & server_write_key
2*m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_iv )); // client_write_IV & server_write_IV
const unsigned char *_key_block = key_block.data();
// client_write_MAC_secret
m_state_client_pending.m_padding_hmac = hmac_padding(m_cp_enc_client, m_state_client_pending.m_alg_mac, _key_block, m_state_client_pending.m_size_mac_key);
_key_block += m_state_client_pending.m_size_mac_key;
// server_write_MAC_secret
_key_block += m_state_client_pending.m_size_mac_key;
// client_write_key
m_state_client_pending.m_key = create_key(m_cp_enc_client, m_state_client_pending.m_alg_encrypt, m_key_exp1, _key_block, m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_key);
_key_block += m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_key;
// server_write_key
_key_block += m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_key;
if (m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_iv && m_tls_version < tls_version_1_1) {
// client_write_IV
if (!CryptSetKeyParam(m_state_client_pending.m_key, KP_IV, _key_block, 0))
throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error setting client_write_IV.");
_key_block += m_state_client_pending.m_size_enc_iv;
}
// Accept client pending state as current client state.
m_state_client = std::move(m_state_client_pending);
// Create finished message, and append to packet.
sanitizing_blob msg_finished(make_message(tls_message_type_handshake, make_finished()));
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), msg_finished.begin(), msg_finished.end());
m_phase = m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_finished] ? phase_application_data : phase_change_cipher_spec;
break;
}
case phase_change_cipher_spec:
// Wait in this phase until server sends change cipher spec and finish.
if (m_state_server.m_alg_encrypt && m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_finished])
m_phase = phase_application_data;
break;
case phase_application_data:
if (m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_hello_request])
m_phase = phase_client_hello;
}
// EAP-Request packet was processed. Clear its data since we use the absence of data to detect first of fragmented message packages.
@@ -512,6 +541,8 @@ void eap::method_tls::get_result(
if (!m_handshake[tls_handshake_type_finished])
throw invalid_argument(__FUNCTION__ " Premature success.");
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TLS_SUCCESS, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data::blank);
// Derive MSK/EMSK for line encryption.
derive_msk();
@@ -530,7 +561,7 @@ void eap::method_tls::get_result(
ppResult->pAttribArray = &m_eap_attr_desc;
// Clear credentials as failed.
cfg_method->m_cred_failed = false;
cfg_method->m_auth_failed = false;
ppResult->fIsSuccess = TRUE;
ppResult->dwFailureReasonCode = ERROR_SUCCESS;
@@ -543,15 +574,19 @@ void eap::method_tls::get_result(
}
case EapPeerMethodResultFailure:
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TLS_FAILURE, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data::blank);
// Clear session resumption data.
cfg_method->m_session_id.clear();
cfg_method->m_master_secret.clear();
// Mark credentials as failed, so GUI can re-prompt user.
cfg_method->m_cred_failed = true;
cfg_method->m_auth_failed = true;
ppResult->fIsSuccess = FALSE;
ppResult->dwFailureReasonCode = EAP_E_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
// Do not report failure to EAPHost, as it will not save updated configuration then. But we need it to save it, to alert user on next connection attempt.
// EAPHost is well aware of the failed condition.
//ppResult->fIsSuccess = FALSE;
//ppResult->dwFailureReasonCode = EAP_E_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
break;
@@ -674,7 +709,7 @@ eap::sanitizing_blob eap::method_tls::make_client_key_exchange(_In_ const tls_ma
// Encrypt pre-master key with server public key first.
sanitizing_blob pms_enc((const unsigned char*)&pms, (const unsigned char*)(&pms + 1));
crypt_key key;
if (!key.import_public(m_cp_enc, X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, &(m_server_cert_chain.front()->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo)))
if (!key.import_public(m_cp_enc_client, X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, &(m_server_cert_chain.front()->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo)))
throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error importing server's public key.");
if (!CryptEncrypt(key, NULL, TRUE, 0, pms_enc))
throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error encrypting PMS.");
@@ -737,7 +772,7 @@ eap::sanitizing_blob eap::method_tls::make_finished() const
throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error finishing SHA-256 hash calculation.");
seed.insert(seed.end(), hash_data.begin(), hash_data.end());
}
sanitizing_blob verify(prf(m_cp_enc, m_alg_prf, m_master_secret, seed, 12));
sanitizing_blob verify(prf(m_cp_enc_client, m_alg_prf, m_master_secret, seed, 12));
msg.insert(msg.end(), verify.begin(), verify.end());
return msg;
@@ -781,7 +816,7 @@ void eap::method_tls::derive_msk()
sanitizing_blob seed(s_label, s_label + _countof(s_label) - 1);
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_client, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_client + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_server, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_server + 1));
sanitizing_blob key_block(prf(m_cp_enc, m_alg_prf, m_master_secret, seed, 2*sizeof(tls_random)));
sanitizing_blob key_block(prf(m_cp_enc_client, m_alg_prf, m_master_secret, seed, 2*sizeof(tls_random)));
const unsigned char *_key_block = key_block.data();
// MS-MPPE-Recv-Key
@@ -877,11 +912,15 @@ void eap::method_tls::process_change_cipher_spec(_In_bytecount_(msg_size) const
if (!m_state_server_pending.m_alg_encrypt)
throw win_runtime_error(EAP_E_EAPHOST_METHOD_INVALID_PACKET, __FUNCTION__ " Change cipher spec received without cipher being negotiated first.");
// Create cryptographics provider (based on server selected cipher?).
if (!m_cp_enc_server.create(NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_AES))
throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error creating cryptographics provider.");
static const unsigned char s_label[] = "key expansion";
sanitizing_blob seed(s_label, s_label + _countof(s_label) - 1);
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_server, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_server + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_client, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_client + 1));
sanitizing_blob key_block(prf(m_cp_enc, m_alg_prf, m_master_secret, seed,
sanitizing_blob key_block(prf(m_cp_enc_server, m_alg_prf, m_master_secret, seed,
2*m_state_server_pending.m_size_mac_key + // client_write_MAC_secret & server_write_MAC_secret (SHA1)
2*m_state_server_pending.m_size_enc_key + // client_write_key & server_write_key
2*m_state_server_pending.m_size_enc_iv )); // client_write_IV & server_write_IV
@@ -891,14 +930,14 @@ void eap::method_tls::process_change_cipher_spec(_In_bytecount_(msg_size) const
_key_block += m_state_server_pending.m_size_mac_key;
// server_write_MAC_secret
m_state_server_pending.m_padding_hmac = hmac_padding(m_cp_enc, m_state_server_pending.m_alg_mac, _key_block, m_state_server_pending.m_size_mac_key);
m_state_server_pending.m_padding_hmac = hmac_padding(m_cp_enc_server, m_state_server_pending.m_alg_mac, _key_block, m_state_server_pending.m_size_mac_key);
_key_block += m_state_server_pending.m_size_mac_key;
// client_write_key
_key_block += m_state_server_pending.m_size_enc_key;
// server_write_key
m_state_server_pending.m_key = create_key(m_state_server_pending.m_alg_encrypt, m_key_exp1, _key_block, m_state_server_pending.m_size_enc_key);
m_state_server_pending.m_key = create_key(m_cp_enc_server, m_state_server_pending.m_alg_encrypt, m_key_exp1, _key_block, m_state_server_pending.m_size_enc_key);
_key_block += m_state_server_pending.m_size_enc_key;
if (m_state_server_pending.m_size_enc_iv && m_tls_version < tls_version_1_1) {
@@ -969,7 +1008,11 @@ void eap::method_tls::process_handshake(_In_bytecount_(msg_size) const void *_ms
if (rec + 1 > rec_end || rec + 1 + rec[0] > rec_end)
throw win_runtime_error(EAP_E_EAPHOST_METHOD_INVALID_PACKET, __FUNCTION__ " Session ID missing or incomplete.");
assert(rec[0] <= 32); // According to RFC 5246 session IDs should not be longer than 32B.
m_session_id.assign(rec + 1, rec + 1 + rec[0]);
if (m_session_id.size() != rec[0] || memcmp(m_session_id.data(), rec + 1, rec[0]) != 0) {
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TLS_SESSION_NEW, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data::blank);
m_session_id.assign(rec + 1, rec + 1 + rec[0]);
} else
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TLS_SESSION_RESUME, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data::blank);
rec += rec[0] + 1;
// Cipher
@@ -1075,7 +1118,7 @@ void eap::method_tls::process_handshake(_In_bytecount_(msg_size) const void *_ms
seed.insert(seed.end(), hash_data.begin(), hash_data.end());
}
if (memcmp(prf(m_cp_enc, m_alg_prf, m_master_secret, seed, 12).data(), rec, 12))
if (memcmp(prf(m_cp_enc_server, m_alg_prf, m_master_secret, seed, 12).data(), rec, 12))
throw win_runtime_error(ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILED, __FUNCTION__ " Integrity check failed.");
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TLS_FINISHED, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_tls), event_data::blank);
@@ -1233,7 +1276,7 @@ void eap::method_tls::encrypt_message(_In_ tls_message_type_t type, _Inout_ sani
{
// Hash sequence number, TLS header, and message.
size_t size_data = data.size();
hmac_hash hash(m_cp_enc, m_state_client.m_alg_mac, m_state_client.m_padding_hmac);
hmac_hash hash(m_cp_enc_client, m_state_client.m_alg_mac, m_state_client.m_padding_hmac);
unsigned __int64 seq_num2 = htonll(m_seq_num_client);
unsigned short size_data2 = htons((unsigned short)size_data);
if (!CryptHashData(hash, (const BYTE*)&seq_num2 , sizeof(seq_num2 ), 0) ||
@@ -1255,7 +1298,7 @@ void eap::method_tls::encrypt_message(_In_ tls_message_type_t type, _Inout_ sani
if (m_tls_version >= tls_version_1_1) {
// TLS 1.1+: Set random IV.
data.insert(data.begin(), m_state_client.m_size_enc_iv, 0);
if (!CryptGenRandom(m_cp_enc, (DWORD)m_state_client.m_size_enc_iv, data.data()))
if (!CryptGenRandom(m_cp_enc_client, (DWORD)m_state_client.m_size_enc_iv, data.data()))
throw win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error generating IV.");
size_data_enc += m_state_client.m_size_enc_iv;
}
@@ -1320,7 +1363,7 @@ void eap::method_tls::decrypt_message(_In_ tls_message_type_t type, _Inout_ sani
size_data -= m_state_server.m_size_mac_hash;
// Hash sequence number, TLS header (without length), original message length, and message.
hmac_hash hash(m_cp_enc, m_state_server.m_alg_mac, m_state_server.m_padding_hmac);
hmac_hash hash(m_cp_enc_server, m_state_server.m_alg_mac, m_state_server.m_padding_hmac);
unsigned __int64 seq_num2 = htonll(m_seq_num_server);
unsigned short size_data2 = htons((unsigned short)size_data);
if (!CryptHashData(hash, (const BYTE*)&seq_num2 , sizeof(seq_num2 ), 0) ||
@@ -1454,10 +1497,11 @@ eap::sanitizing_blob eap::method_tls::prf(
HCRYPTKEY eap::method_tls::create_key(
_In_ ALG_ID alg,
_In_ HCRYPTKEY key,
_In_bytecount_(size_secret) const void *secret,
_In_ size_t size_secret)
_In_ HCRYPTPROV cp,
_In_ ALG_ID alg,
_In_ HCRYPTKEY key,
_In_bytecount_(size_secret) const void *secret,
_In_ size_t size_secret)
{
#if 1
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(key);
@@ -1483,7 +1527,7 @@ HCRYPTKEY eap::method_tls::create_key(
// Import the key.
winstd::crypt_key key_out;
if (!key_out.import(m_cp_enc, key_blob.data(), (DWORD)key_blob.size(), NULL, 0))
if (!key_out.import(cp, key_blob.data(), (DWORD)key_blob.size(), NULL, 0))
throw winstd::win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error importing key.");
return key_out.detach();
#else
@@ -1529,7 +1573,7 @@ HCRYPTKEY eap::method_tls::create_key(
// Is random PS required at all? We are importing a clear-text session key with the exponent-of-one key. How low on security can we get?
key_blob.insert(key_blob.end(), size_ps, 0);
unsigned char *ps = &*(key_blob.end() - size_ps);
CryptGenRandom(m_cp_enc, (DWORD)size_ps, ps);
CryptGenRandom(cp, (DWORD)size_ps, ps);
for (size_t i = 0; i < size_ps; i++)
if (ps[i] == 0) ps[i] = 1;
#endif
@@ -1545,7 +1589,7 @@ HCRYPTKEY eap::method_tls::create_key(
// Import the key.
winstd::crypt_key key_out;
if (!key_out.import(m_cp_enc, key_blob.data(), (DWORD)key_blob.size(), key, 0))
if (!key_out.import(cp, key_blob.data(), (DWORD)key_blob.size(), key, 0))
throw winstd::win_runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Error importing key.");
return key_out.detach();
#endif