ID 3. C style pointer casting from security audit fixed

This commit is contained in:
2016-10-03 11:40:30 +02:00
parent 28408fcea7
commit 559ffc5ead
20 changed files with 178 additions and 178 deletions

View File

@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ void eap::method_ttls::derive_msk()
//
static const unsigned char s_label[] = "ttls keying material";
sanitizing_blob seed(s_label, s_label + _countof(s_label) - 1);
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_client, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_client + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_server, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_server + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&m_random_client), reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&m_random_client + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&m_random_server), reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&m_random_server + 1));
sanitizing_blob key_block(prf(m_cp, CALG_TLS1PRF, m_master_secret, seed, 2*sizeof(tls_random)));
_key_block = key_block.data();
#else
@@ -197,8 +197,8 @@ void eap::method_ttls::derive_challenge()
#if EAP_TLS < EAP_TLS_SCHANNEL
static const unsigned char s_label[] = "ttls challenge";
sanitizing_blob seed(s_label, s_label + _countof(s_label) - 1);
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_client, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_client + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_server, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_server + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&m_random_client), reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&m_random_client + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&m_random_server), reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&m_random_server + 1));
sanitizing_blob keying(prf(m_cp, CALG_TLS1PRF, m_master_secret, seed, sizeof(challenge_mschapv2) + 1));
memcpy(&inner_mschapv2->m_challenge_server, keying.data(), sizeof(challenge_mschapv2));
inner_mschapv2->m_ident = keying[sizeof(challenge_mschapv2) + 0];
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ void eap::method_ttls::process_application_data(_In_bytecount_(size_msg) const v
status = EncryptMessage(m_sc_ctx, 0, &buf_desc, 0);
if (FAILED(status))
throw sec_runtime_error(status, __FUNCTION__ " Error encrypting message.");
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), (const unsigned char*)buf[0].pvBuffer, (const unsigned char*)buf[0].pvBuffer + buf[0].cbBuffer + buf[1].cbBuffer + buf[2].cbBuffer);
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(buf[0].pvBuffer), reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(buf[0].pvBuffer) + buf[0].cbBuffer + buf[1].cbBuffer + buf[2].cbBuffer);
#endif
} else {
// Empty packets represent ACK message, and are not encrypted.