Our own TLS merged back to master and compiles conditionally

This commit is contained in:
2016-08-23 22:46:00 +02:00
parent a9baa07227
commit 5332b538aa
11 changed files with 1800 additions and 34 deletions

View File

@@ -71,6 +71,22 @@ void eap::method_ttls::process_request_packet(
// Do the TLS.
method_tls::process_request_packet(pReceivedPacket, dwReceivedPacketSize, pEapOutput);
#if EAP_TLS < EAP_TLS_SCHANNEL
if (m_phase == phase_application_data) {
// Send inner authentication.
if (!m_state_client.m_alg_encrypt)
throw runtime_error(__FUNCTION__ " Refusing to send credentials unencrypted.");
m_module.log_event(&EAPMETHOD_TTLS_INNER_CRED, event_data((unsigned int)eap_type_ttls), event_data(m_cred.m_inner->get_name()), event_data::blank);
m_packet_res.m_code = EapCodeResponse;
m_packet_res.m_id = m_packet_req.m_id;
m_packet_res.m_flags = 0;
sanitizing_blob msg_application(make_message(tls_message_type_application_data, make_pap_client()));
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), msg_application.begin(), msg_application.end());
}
#endif
}
@@ -116,12 +132,14 @@ void eap::method_ttls::get_result(
throw win_runtime_error(ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, __FUNCTION__ " Not supported.");
}
#if EAP_TLS >= EAP_TLS_SCHANNEL
// EAP-TTLS uses different label in PRF for MSK derivation than EAP-TLS.
static const DWORD s_key_id = 0x01; // EAP-TTLSv0 Keying Material
static const SecPkgContext_EapPrfInfo s_prf_info = { 0, sizeof(s_key_id), (PBYTE)&s_key_id };
SECURITY_STATUS status = SetContextAttributes(m_sc_ctx, SECPKG_ATTR_EAP_PRF_INFO, (void*)&s_prf_info, sizeof(s_prf_info));
if (FAILED(status))
throw sec_runtime_error(status, __FUNCTION__ "Error setting EAP-TTLS PRF in Schannel.");
#endif
// The TLS was OK.
method_tls::get_result(EapPeerMethodResultSuccess, ppResult);
@@ -136,6 +154,43 @@ void eap::method_ttls::get_result(
}
#if EAP_TLS < EAP_TLS_SCHANNEL
void eap::method_ttls::derive_msk()
{
//
// TLS versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] define the same PRF
// function, and any EAP-TTLSv0 implementation based on these versions
// of TLS must use the PRF defined therein. It is expected that future
// versions of or extensions to the TLS protocol will permit alternative
// PRF functions to be negotiated. If an alternative PRF function is
// specified for the underlying TLS version or has been negotiated
// during the TLS handshake negotiation, then that alternative PRF
// function must be used in EAP-TTLSv0 computations instead of the TLS
// 1.0/1.1 PRF.
//
// [Extensible Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0) (Chapter 7.8. Use of TLS PRF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5281#section-7.8)
//
// If we use PRF_SHA256() the key exchange fails. Therefore we use PRF of TLS 1.0/1.1.
//
static const unsigned char s_label[] = "ttls keying material";
sanitizing_blob seed(s_label, s_label + _countof(s_label) - 1);
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_client, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_client + 1));
seed.insert(seed.end(), (const unsigned char*)&m_random_server, (const unsigned char*)(&m_random_server + 1));
sanitizing_blob key_block(prf(m_cp, CALG_TLS1PRF, m_master_secret, seed, 2*sizeof(tls_random)));
const unsigned char *_key_block = key_block.data();
// MSK: MPPE-Recv-Key
memcpy(&m_key_mppe_client, _key_block, sizeof(tls_random));
_key_block += sizeof(tls_random);
// MSK: MPPE-Send-Key
memcpy(&m_key_mppe_server, _key_block, sizeof(tls_random));
_key_block += sizeof(tls_random);
}
#else
void eap::method_ttls::process_application_data(_In_bytecount_(size_msg) const void *msg, _In_ size_t size_msg)
{
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(msg);
@@ -183,6 +238,8 @@ void eap::method_ttls::process_application_data(_In_bytecount_(size_msg) const v
m_packet_res.m_data.insert(m_packet_res.m_data.end(), (const unsigned char*)buf[0].pvBuffer, (const unsigned char*)buf[0].pvBuffer + buf[0].cbBuffer + buf[1].cbBuffer + buf[2].cbBuffer);
}
#endif
eap::sanitizing_blob eap::method_ttls::make_pap_client() const
{